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It is natural for military historians to focus on purely national issues and national history. Indeed, 
writing about coalition warfare is 
notoriously difficult, particularly 
when it comes to using sources from 
all of the key national players, sources 
subject to uneven availability. Then 
there is the Canadian proclivity 
towards making up for lost time 
in military history affairs, which 
generates gravitation towards 
examining Canadian combat arms 
units to the exclusion of the activities 
of higher headquarters and support 
units. Indeed, we expect our larger 
allies, with their more robust history 
production apparati, to take care of 
themselves and our coalition history. 
As a result, a danger exists that we 
may overlook critical aspects of our 
military history particularly when we 
have allied forces under Canadian 
command.
 In addition to providing a battle 
group, a provincial reconstruction 
team, special operations forces, 
and mentoring teams to the war 
in Afghanistan, Canada holds 
rotating command of the NATO-led 
International Security Assistance 
Force’s (ISAF) Regional Command 
(South) Headquarters. RC (South) 
is responsible for four brigade-sized 
national commands or task forces 
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that conform to the main provinces in 
southern Afghanistan: TF Helmand 
(British); TF Oruzgan (Dutch); TF 
Zabol (Romanian and American) and 
TF Kandahar (Canada). In addition, 
an Afghan corps headquarters, 205 
Corps, is the counterpart to RC 
(South) and each province boasts 
an Afghan National Army (ANA) 
brigade. For the most part, each ANA 
brigade is twinned with each ISAF 
brigade and will control between 
one and four kandaks, or Afghan 
battalion-sized forces. 
 Scarce national resources or 
“enablers” like helicopters, close 
air  support ,  unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs), various Intelligence 
Surveillance and Target Acquisition 
(ISTAR) capabilities, Civil-Military 
Cooperation (CIMIC) and artillery 
operate everywhere in RC (South) 
depending on where they are needed, 
but usually come under the control of 
a provincial brigade headquarters for 
the duration of a given operation and 
then they revert to national control. 
Consequently, few operations in 
Afghanistan are conducted by a 
single country on its own.
 In January 2008, Canada took 
command of RC (South) Headquarters. 
Led by Major-General Marc Lessard, 
RC (South) HQ deployed resources 
in Kandahar Province in order to 
supplement operations already 
underway commanded by Brigadier-
General Guy Laroche, the commander 
of Task Force Kandahar. One of 
those resources was an entity called 
Regional Battle Group (South) or 
RBG(S). The RBG(S) acted as a regional 
reserve force and could be employed 
by RC (South) HQ anywhere in the 
region it deemed necessary. The only 
self-imposed caveat was that the force 
had to be used to generate enduring 
operational-level effects, not only 
short-term tactical or provincial-level 
effects. 
 The United Kingdom assigned 
the 1st Battalion, The Royal Gurkha 
AbstrAct: In February 2008 Regional Battle 
Group (South) in Afghanistan, based on 
The 1st Battalion, The Royal Gurkha Rifles 
supported by Canadian “enablers” and 
working with Afghan national security 
forces, conducted a mission known as 
Operation SOHIL LARAM II in the Maywand 
district of Kandahar province. A weak 
NATO presence coupled with a corrupt 
police force had allowed the Taliban 
to turn Maywand into a safe haven. 
Following the dismissal of the police force, 
Op SOHIL LARAM II was successful in 
disrupting Taliban operations, reasserting 
government authority and regaining the 
confidence of the local population. In 
addition, the disruption of Taliban forces 
allowed the relief in place of Canadian 
battle groups to proceed without the usual 
interference.
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Rifles as RBG(S) in the fall of 2007 
“without strings,” meaning that the 
usual restrictive national caveats 
were lifted for the duration. This 
light infantry battalion, composed 
of Nepalese Gurkhas led by British 
officers and supplemented with 
Canadian “enablers,” proved to be 
a formidable and agile asset and 
significantly contributed to achieving 
ISAF’s aims in Kandahar Province. 
This article will examine Operation 
SOHIL LARAM II, an operation 
conducted by the Regional Battle 
Group (South) in Maywand district of 
Kandahar province in late February 
2008.
The Operational Level 
Situation
The situation in RC (South) in early 2008 was calm relative to 
previous years. The United Kingdom 
had, since 2006, tripled the size of its 
forces in Helmand province, from 
a battle group to nearly a brigade. 
Headway was made in the Musa 
Qala area and even some senior 
Taliban commanders were starting 
to join the PTS amnesty programme. 
In Oruzgan province, the Dutch task 
force controlled the main population 
centres, while an Australian special 
operations task force kept the Taliban 
off balance elsewhere. Zabol, recently 
taken over by a Romanian battle 
group, still boasted an American 
Provincial Reconstruction Team 
(PRT) and for the most part kept the 
vital Ring Road South (RRS) open. 
 In Kandahar province,  the 
Canadian battlegroup and an Afghan 
National Army company kicked the 
Taliban out of Arghandab district, less 
than five kilometers from Kandahar 
City. This last move was the latest 
in a campaign to block Taliban 
attempts to take control of a district 
that abutted Ring Road South and 
the city. The enemy had, since 2006, 
tried to interdict the four main routes 
into Kandahar City. Zharey district 
was, in January 2008, garrisoned by 
ANA and Afghan National Police 
and there was a substantial amount 
of development taking place. Over in 
Panjwayi district, the Taliban that had 
been pushed out of Zharey mounted 
an IED (improvised explosive device) 
campaign on the main roads there. 
Taliban still operated in Zharey, 
but unlike back in 2006-07, they 
were unable to seriously control the 
population. There was virtually no 
enemy activity around Kandahar 
Air Field (KAF), nor was the enemy 
operating along Highway 4, the main 
trade route between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan in the south.
 Task Force Kandahar and the 
ANA’s 205 Corps did not have the 
forces nor the resources to garrison 
the entire province, so they focused 
on districts that were vital ground. 
Northern districts like Khakriz, 
Ghorak and Sha Wali Kot had varying 
levels of Taliban influence but for the 
most part that influence remained 
local. 
The 1st Battalion, The Royal Gurkha Rifles, 
acted as the Regional Battlegroup (South) 
reserve force in 2007-08. 1 RGR developed 
a close working relationship with the 
Canadian task force.
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 The Taliban maintained training 
sites, weapons dumps, and command 
nodes inside Pakistan, notably in and 
around the city of Quetta, where the 
Taliban command for the south, the 
Quetta Shura, was located. The modus 
operandi was to infiltrate fighters 
individually or in small numbers into 
Afghanistan, smuggle in weapons 
and ammunition separately, mate the 
two and then fight. Suicide bombers 
had a separate but parallel system. To 
mount any sort of operation inside 
Kandahar City or in the adjacent 
districts took time. A command node 
(or nodes depending on the size 
of the force) had to be established 
first, followed by a logistics node 
to stockpile weapons and ammo. 
“Rat lines” consisting of safe houses, 
sympathizers in the transportation 
community, and facilitators of all 
types had to be positioned and 
activated. Notably, the rat lines 
sometimes worked in reverse for 
Taliban casualty evacuation. 
 These shadowy networks were 
notoriously difficult to track down, 
in part because the police forces 
(the exception was the National 
Directorate of Security (NDS – Afghan 
Secret Police), which was small but 
fairly effective) were not capable of 
taking a sophisticated approach to 
doing so. Checkpoints and police 
patrols could be bribed, others could 
be intimidated, still others adopted a 
“live and let live” policy. ISAF and 
OEF forces, however, maintained 
steady pressure on the enemy system 
to generate as much friction as 
possible within it.
 The Taliban also tried their hand 
at establishing a parallel government, 
but this generally took negative 
forms as opposed to competitive 
forms. Attacking schools and the 
health care system in order to deny 
effective government services was 
not the same as actually providing 
parallel services, but there were small 
numbers of Taliban “judges” and 
there were “wandering Mullahs” 
proselytizing in the rural areas, 
all backed up with a sophisticated 
intimidation campaign that made 
the Taliban look more powerful 
then they actually were, especially 
in the rural areas. In other districts, 
the Taliban co-opted corrupt local 
leaders, or other men who played 
both sided against the middle for 
sheer survival or profit or both. These 
people tended to overlap with the 
narcotic producers in certain areas 
of RC (South).
 The situation as it stood in late 
January 2008 was that the enemy was 
incapable of interdicting the main 
highways throughout RC (South) and 
failed to interfere with operations at 
Kandahar Air Field. The highways 
and the airfield are absolutely critical 
to the ISAF, OEF and Afghan efforts 
in RC (South). Second, the Taliban 
had not taken Kandahar City. Control 
of Kandahar City is critical to the 
control of southern Afghanistan both 
geographically and psychologically: 
not only is it a transportation hub, it 
is also the religious/political centre 
of the region. Weakened in all the 
adjacent districts, thwarted in their 
latest endeavour in Arghandab 
district, the Quetta Shura was at a 
crossroads. 
 If the Quetta Shura hoped to 
move back to the heady days of 
2006 when they seriously contested 
coalition control of Zharey and 
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Panjwayi districts, mounted an 
incessant suicide bomb campaign 
in the city and showered Kandahar 
Air Field with rockets nearly every 
night, the networks, command nodes, 
and logistics nodes had to be re-built 
nearly everywhere. The cells in place 
had to be revitalized, reinforced, 
and resupplied. Consequently, the 
networks in the districts in the next 
ring away from the city had to be 
revitalized first as a precondition. As 
it stood in early 2008, if the Taliban 
were unable to achieve the saliency 
they had in 2006, they would lose even 
more credibility with the population. 
That credibility was eroded daily with 
each new government reconstruction 
or governance initiative. 
 The generalities of this situation 
were known in RC (South) and in 
Task Force Kandahar in early 2008 
– the pressure had to be kept up in an 
overall sense across the region. The 
issue in Kandahar province, however, 
was the upcoming relief-in-place 
(RIP) of the 3rd Battalion, R22eR 
battlegroup with 2nd Battalion, 
Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light 
Infantry. In the past, the enemy 
exploited less than seamless RIPs to 
the detriment of the departing and 
arriving forces. The arriving force 
was usually inexperienced and took 
time to get up to speed with the deep 
nuances of operating in the districts 
and communities. Disruptive activity 
by coalition forces could shield the 
RIP and buy the incoming forces time 
to acclimatize.
 At the same time, enemy forces 
in the peripheral districts tended to 
operate in “seams.” They understood 
the problems of coordination between 
coalition partners on the artificial 
boundary lines established by staffs 
and understood that coalition control 
lessened the further away from 
the main population centres that 
they operated. If the Taliban hoped 
to revitalize their networks, they 
would work out of those seams first, 
use them as staging areas, and then 
infiltrate and support their forces 
in districts adjacent to the city. The 
combination of these factors pointed 
the planning staffs from RBG(S), 
TFK, and RC (South) towards one 
particular district – Maywand.
 Maywand district lies, from east 
to west, between Zharey district 
and Helmand province; Ring Road 
South runs straight through the 
middle of the district, through the 
prosperous agricultural community 
of Hutel. From north to south, 
Maywand is sandwiched between 
the mountainous Ghorak district and 
the Arghandab river and then the 
inhospitable Reg Desert. The Dasht, 
as the wide open plain is called, is a 
millennia-old trade and transit route 
between the Indian subcontinent and 
Persia. 
Ch-47 Chinooks like this one conducted the night airmobile insertion of 1 RGR into the Band-e
Timor communities in Maywand district during the opening stages of Op SOHIL LARAM II.
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 Operationally, Maywand was a 
seam between Task Force Helmand 
and Task Force Kandahar, right smack 
dab in the middle. The district had a 
reputation as a singularly large rat 
line connecting extensive infiltration 
routes in the Helmand river valley 
that came in from Pakistan, to the 
western edge of Zharey district and 
the western-most point of Panjwayi 
district. Intelligence analysts assumed 
over the years that the southern part 
of the district, an elongated series of 
communities called Band-e Timor, 
was a Taliban stronghold, out of 
reach because of the priorities to 
protect the city and far enough 
south from the main highway to be 
off the beaten path. Word filtered 
out the previous year that there was 
even a functional Taliban shadow 
government complete with judges 
operating there. 
 The district leader and his police 
had a reputation for being brutally 
corrupt but because he had been 
appointed by the current governor, 
he appeared untouchable. Rumours 
abounded that his police hi-jacked 
World Food Program (WFP) aid 
trucks with impunity and even 
executed their drivers back in the 
summer of 2007 because WFP refused 
to pay him off. There was no Afghan 
National Army presence. Tribally, 
Maywand was dominated by Noorzai 
and familial connections between 
the district and the border city of 
Spinboldak reportedly involved 
narcotics smuggling. in short, it was 
an ideal district to house a Taliban 
logistics node and rat line. 
 There had been two coalition 
forays into Maywand back in 2007. 
The 2 RCR battlegroup conduced 
operations through the eastern 
portion of Band-e Timor with a 
company group in May, while the 
1 RGR’s predecessor RGB(S), the 
1st Battalion, Royal Welsh (The 
Royal Welsh Fusiliers) essentially 
conducted a similar operation in the 
fall, but these were independent and 
temporary operations generally not 
coupled with Afghan efforts in the 
district.
 The potential operational-level 
effects of inserting the Regional 
Battlegroup (South) into Maywand 
district were considerable. It would 
disrupt the ratline into Zharey and 
Panjwayi districts, especially during 
the RIP. It would demonstrate to 
the Taliban that coalition forces did 
not fear operating in districts they 
did not traditionally operate in and 
that coalition forces would operate 
with impunity. Such an operation 
would also enhance security along 
Ring Road South, the link between 
Kandahar Air Field and Task Force 
Helmand. 
 The main problem, as  the 
planners knew, was that without 
an enduring coalition presence the 
enemy would eventually re-infiltrate 
the district and be back in business. 
“Emptying the garbage” as the 
Canadians called it, or as the British 
named it, “mowing the lawn” had its 
uses, however. Disruption without 
occupation was not optimal, but 
there was no apparent solution to that 
problem in the initial stages of the 
planning process, so SOHIL LARAM 
II started off conceptually as a large-
scale RBG(S) raid.
Task Organization
RBG(S) or Task Force TIGER was based on 1st Battalion, The 
Royal Gurkha Rifles (1 RGR). Led by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Jonny Bourne, 
1 RGR normally had three light 
infantry companies. In Afghanistan, 
however, 1 RGR detached one 
company to Helmand province, 
leaving two infantry companies 
available for RBG(S) operations: 
“A” Company led by Major Paul 
“Pitch” Pitchfork, and “C” Company 
led by Major Will Kefford.1 There 
was a support company broken 
down into two Fire Support Groups 
(machine guns, snipers) and a mortar 
platoon of six 82 mm mortars. 1 RGR 
had its own doctor and medical 
team. In terms of mobility, one 
company was transported in Vector 
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vehicles, essentially a six-wheeled, 
uparmoured Pinzgauer truck, and 
WMIK Landrovers armed with .50 
cal machine guns and M-19 grenade 
launchers. The other company was 
carried by a squadron of Viking 
tracked oversnow vehicles armed 
with 7.62mm general purpose 
machine guns and crewed by Royal 
Marines. Small portable bridges and 
fascines were carried to assist in 
moving across water obstacles that 
criss-crossed the areas near the river. 
1 RGR had also just conducted two 
airmobile operations, one in northern 
Kandahar province, and the other 
into the Chora Valley in Oruzgan 
with the Australian SAS Regiment, 
and was proficient in those types of 
operations as well. 
 1 RGR had also worked closely 
with the Canadian battlegroup on 
at least two occasions in Zharey and 
Panjwayi districts. In each operation, 
a Gurkha company operated under 
Canadian battlegroup command. 
1 RGR was short on long-range 
firepower, however. Though the 
Gurkhas were equipped with a 
variety of mortars, Lieutenant-
Colonel Bourne requested and 
received a two-gun detachment of 
M-777 155 mm guns, two 81 mm 
mortars and a troop of TLAV APCs2 
led by Lieutenant Candice Dunn 
from the newly-arrived “B” Battery, 
2 Royal Canadian Horse Artillery. 
Since 1 RGR was the regional mobile 
reserve, it normally did not have its 
own specialist “enablers.” Canadian 
Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) 
and Tactical Psychological Operations 
Teams (TPT or PSYOPS) teams 
were also attached. For intelligence 
collection and liaison purposes, 
the Afghan National Directorate 
of Security attached a number of 
officers. A Canadian Joint Terminal 
Air Controller (JTAC) from Air 
Command and another from the RAF 
Regiment (a squadron of which was 
protecting Kandahar Air Field) with 
their specialist communications gear 
also joined the force so 1 RGR could 
communicate with close air support 
and attack aviation resources. 
The Plan
Planning SOHIL LARAM II was a essentially a three-way dialogue 
between the 1 RGR, TFK, and RBG(S) 
staffs. That dialogue established 
the justification as to exactly why 
the Gurkha battalion would be 
employed in Maywand district; 
conceptually how the battle group 
would be employed, with several 
options depending on transportation 
availability; and the coordination and 
deconfliction aspects. All of this had 
to be approved by Major-General 
Marc Lessard after his multinational 
staff at Regional Command (South) 
gave the thumbs up.
 Op SOHIL LARAM II  was 
designed to achieve a number of 
effects. The most obvious was the 
disruption of enemy activity in 
Maywand district, flushing out 
and destroying leadership targets 
which would result in positive 
effects both Helmand and Kandahar 
provinces. As for the district itself, 
the operation was designed to leave 
the local population with a positive 
impression of the coalition forces, 
ANA and ANP with the hope that 
this would serve as a basis for future 
operations intended to establish 
a permanent Afghan government 
presence throughout the district. 
Finally, the operation was designed 
to improve the police presence 
along Highway 1 by reconstructing 
ANP checkpoints, many of which 
were rudimentary at best, partially-
mannned and nearly indefensible. 
 There were a number of other 
reasons to conduct a Maywand 
“A” Company 1 RGR conducts a compound 
search on Objective CHELSEA. This action 
would stimulate enemy movement and 
make their leaders more vulnerable to 
other coalition action.
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operation at this particular time. 
One particular event on 13 February 
2008 was significant. A Sperwer 
TUAV (Tactical Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle) observed three World Food 
Program trucks being hijacked in 
broad daylight just east of Hutel. 
The attackers bogged one truck 
down attempting to escape while 
an RG-31 Nayala and a section from 
the Canadian Operational Mentor 
and Liaison Team (OMLT) and two 
platoons from 2nd Kandak in Howz-e 
Madad raced to respond. With a B-1B 
in support, and the TUAV tracking 
the movements of the hijackers, the 
OMLT and the Afghan National 
Army determined that police from 
Maywand district were responsible. 
This latest attack was the final straw 
and resulted in the replacement of all 
160 police in Maywand district by the 
Kandahar provincial Chief of Police, 
General Saquib. 
 The  unplanned wholesa le 
replacement of the Maywand police 
during the operational planning 
process now provided a window of 
opportunity to renew the district. 
Rather than just raiding into the 
remoter parts of Maywand, the 
RBG(S) would be able to generate 
synergy by facilitating a combined 
coalition forces-police presence 
and help the new police establish 
themselves which would be a critical 
step towards improving governance 
in the district. There was an operating 
theory that the district chief and 
the corrupt police were in cahoots 
regarding aid convoy shakedowns, 
but no action had been taken against 
the district chief for a variety of 
reasons. The removal of “his” police 
meant that he would lose “muscle” 
and therefore be more compliant. 
As the planning process progressed, 
2nd Kandak was brought into the 
operation, initially at company 
strength. A second company was 
later added. Even though 2nd 
Kandak would be committed for 
a limited period, the information 
operations and governance benefits 
that could be derived from highly 
visible joint ANA-ANP patrolling 
could be substantial, especially on the 
Maywand population. 
 The assessment of Taliban 
forces in Maywand suggested that 
the Band-e Timor strip north of 
the Arghandab River concealed a 
facilitation network plus a line of 
arms dumps and an intelligence 
node on the boundary with Zharey 
district. An enemy IED cell was 
known to operate in Ghorak district, 
north of the Garmabak Pass, but had 
sortied south previously and killed 
both British and Canadian troops 
passing through the district. The 
presence of static enemy fighting 
forces could not be confirmed. The 
Taliban generally moved through 
the area singly or in small groups, 
but sometimes coalesced to shoot up 
the Maywand district centre for info 
ops effect. Enemy medium value 
individuals (MVIs), or leadership 
targets, were present from time to 
time, most likely using the Band-e 
Timor area as a rat line. Significant 
movement of coalition forces into 
the district would set these pieces in 
“A” Company 1 RGR moves out from Objective CHELSEA. The terrain
in this photo is typical for the southern Maywand district.
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motion, either to escape or to engage, 
and then tactical responses by 1 RGR 
battlegroup would be generated 
accordingly. With a dispersed enemy 
hiding amongst the population, this 
was one of several ways to flush them 
out. 
 Much of the staff effort dealt 
with coordination and deconfliction 
to avoid situations like the Tarnak 
Farms tragedy in 2002 where four 
Canadian soldiers were killed by 
a bomb dropped by a US aircraft. 
For example, at least three types 
of special operations forces, none 
of them belonging to RC(South), 
operated throughout the region. 
They possessed their own ISTAR 
resources and air support, and those 
resources had to be coordinated with 
ISTAR and air support assigned to 
RC(South). To make matters more 
complicated, some of these platforms 
were the same, ie: they worked for 
NATO ISAF as well as the other 
entities. The priority was not always 
NATO ISAF, depending what was 
going on elsewhere in the country, so 
availability had to be confirmed.
 There were legal aspects that 
men like Lieutenant-Colonel Marc 
Gendron, the LEGAD (Legal Advisor) 
at RC(South), had to sort out. What 
rules of engagement were going to 
be used - Canadian, British, NATO? 
Under what conditions would they 
change? Who would approve those 
changes? What could be blown up 
and what couldn’t? 
 At Task Force Kandahar, control 
measures between the battle groups’ 
forces operating in neighbouring 
Zharey district and the RBG(S) had 
to be established. For example, the 
templated range of a 120 mm gun 
on a Leopard 2 A6M was in excess 
of four kilometers. If the tanks were 
firing at something to the west of 
Zharey, could they accidentally hit 
the manoeuvring units? Or, if the 
Van Doos used artillery on a target in 
Panjwayi, nobody wanted lumbering 
CH-47’s flying through the rounds 
as they arced through the airspace. 
These are not mundane matters when 
millions of dollars of helicopters and 
several hundred priceless human 
lives are at stake. 
 One of the main issues in planning 
SOHIL LARAM II revolved around 
the early warning problem. The 
expansion of the cell phone network in 
Kandahar province since 2003 meant 
that any person with a cell phone 
was a potential sensor. The Taliban 
had non-insurgent insurgents (locals 
paid to do a specific, one-time task), 
left – In the field the 1 RGR battalion tac 
headquarters has the ability to link to 
imagery provided by a variety of unmanned 
aerial vehicles, including MQ-1 Predator 
and MQ-9 Reaper.
below left – Influence operations include 
the use of Key Leader Engagements. In 
this case, a local shura in Band-e Timor 
sits down with Lieutenant-Colonel Jonny 
Bourne for a chat about local expectations 
and conditions.
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ideological sympathizers from the old 
days or people coerced into providing 
information. In effect, each district 
had an insurgent reporting network 
that was activated the moment 
coalition forces arrived on the scene. 
The network could communicate 
in a variety of ways. This reporting 
network extended from Maywand 
to the gates of Kandahar Air Field 
(and probably within the base itself). 
Deception, therefore, was a critical 
component in the plan. 
 When 1 RGR wargamed the 
operation it became clear that the 
presence of 100-plus vehicles on 
Ring Road South during the day or 
night would be more than enough to 
activate the enemy warning system. 
The enemy would not know exactly 
where the force was going, however. 
To get from the highway and into 
Band-e Timor would take time – it is 
over 12 kilometers with no roads. It 
would be enough time for the enemy 
to hide or disperse before the force 
arrived. 
 The obvious answer was to 
conduct an airmobile insertion at 
night to achieve surprise. There 
were two problems with this course 
of action. The first was helicopter 
availability and the second was the 
perfidious weather situation. Night 
airmobile operations are complicated. 
Throw dust into the mix and the 
risk level rose dramatically, as the 
Americans found out during the 
Desert One disaster in 1980.3 There 
were only so many helicopters and 
they were heavily tasked. 1 RGR 
generated two courses of action – a 
ground move and insertion, and a 
combination ground move and 
airmobile insertion. 
 The second course of action was 
the best. The ground convoys would 
move along Ring Road South, the 
enemy would activate the early 
warning system and watch the 
vehicles. As the ground force moved 
off the roads south towards Band-e 
Timor, the enemy would be fixated 
on its progress. Without warning the 
airmobile force would emerge out of 
the desert from the south and surprise 
them. The first course of action was 
second best but the planners came 
up with a scheme to use air power to 
take out any enemy forces trying to 
escape the area. 
 The elongated nature of Band-e 
Timor posed some challenges. There 
were clusters of compound complexes 
all along the river for some 15-20 
kilometers. There were irrigation 
systems, including a canal with 
fast running water moving through 
and between the complexes. Each 
compound cluster was separated 
by rolling but open arid terrain. 
The planners decided that the two 
companies would be inserted on 
either end of the Band-e Timor river 
zone and work towards the centre. 
An Artillery Manoeuvre Area (AMA) 
for the Canadian guns and the 1 RGR 
logistics echelon would be established 
on the Dasht in part to act as a block 
but also to give the artillery reach to 
the south. 
 On the way through Hutel, one 
platoon would be dropped off and 
start working with the new police, 
while the battalion command post 
would be set up in the district centre. 
Part of one of the companies would 
later be brought north to Hutel and 
join in operations there when the 
Afghan National Army arrived. If 
enemy forces appeared in the north 
near Ghorak, a contingency plan 
was formulated to respond to that 
move. 
Execution: Insertion and 
Pursuit
During the afternoon of 20 February the weather situation 
was not good as the infantry 
companies rehearsed embarking 
and disembarking their helicopter 
chalks in an open field. A small 
dust event was moving into the 
Kandahar area and the hills that were 
normally visible from the airfield 
were obscured with dust. On the 
evening of 20 February elements of 
2nd Kandak moved to Camp Roberts, 
the 1 RGR camp on Kandahar Air 
Field, to link up with the Vikings 
and Vectors. The weather cleared 
enough by then and the airmobile 
insertion was approved. The convoys 
departed around midnight while 
the two infantry companies awoke 
from forced rest, prepared their 
equipment, and were bused to the 
helicopter hanger area.
 At 0235 hours IFF (identification 
of friend or foe) control measures 
(glow sticks and min-beacons) were 
activated and attached to helmets 
and weapons checked. RAF ground 
personnel mustered the chalks in 
the dark as the crews of the CH-47 
and Lynx helicopters prepared their 
aircraft. The APUs whined as they 
started the engines, and soon the loud 
whop-whop-whop of the huge blades 
smacked the air. The Gurkhas filed 
in, and when everybody was loaded, 
RAF Chinooks and Army Air Corps 
Lynx taxied into a line and lifted off 
the runway into a sharp banking 
turn that took the force into the 
Reg Desert. British Army Air Corps 
AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, 
already in the air, joined up to escort 
the force. Helicopters are loud by 
nature so everything possible was 
done to mask the noise signature 
and achieve surprise. In this case, 
the desert was empty and the enemy 
early warning net does not extend 
to the south out of the built-up areas 
between Kandahar and Maywand. 
The circuitous route also gave time 
for the slower convoys moving along 
Ring Road South to get into position. 
Indeed, enemy “eyes” were focused 
on the Vikings and Vectors as they 
drove towards Helmand. 
 With the doors open and gunners 
with night vision leaning out checking 
the ground, the temperature inside 
the Chinooks was near freezing for 
the 40 minutes it took to fly from 
KAF to a point south of Maywand 
district. The full moon bathed the 
desert sand so it looked like an ocean 
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as the helicopters surfed the ground 
effect at low level. At this point the 
force split into two and headed for 
their respective company helicopter 
landing sites (HLS). The loadies held 
up two fingers – two minutes to the 
HLS – and the Gurkhas tapped each 
man ahead of them with two fingers. 
Everybody stood up and seconds 
later the machines’ noses lurched up 
to flare into the HLS. “A” Company 
had a rough time – its Chinooks hit 
the ground hard, probably because 
of the moon-dust-like powder that 
obscured the distance to the ground. 
There were several injuries including 
broken noses and twisted knees. 
 The Gurkhas poured out into a 
defensive posture as the Chinooks 
and Lynxs lifted off, showering the 
soldiers with large rocks and dust 
for several seconds. Once the birds 
were gone the company commanders 
checked the surrounding area with 
night vision and when satisfied, 
started to move off in the dark 
towards the objective compound 
complexes. There was no contact at 
first.
 “A” Company got into complex 
CHELSEA without incident and 
initiated several searches. “C” 
Company, on the other hand, 
immediately bumped into the Taliban 
after insertion near NEWCASTLE 
and BATH. 7 Platoon and 9 Platoon 
disembarked on the HLSs, with 7 
Platoon to the north. A group of 
enemy in a compound complex south 
of 9 Platoon’s HLS were spotted by 
an orbiting MQ-1 Predator. 7 Platoon 
swung into a blocking position to 
the west of the complex as 9 Platoon 
moved in, but the enemy pulled 
out to the south to another group of 
compounds. 7 Platoon moved south 
in parallel and there were some shots 
fired. The company commander 
moved 9 Platoon in a leapfrog to the 
complex to the south of where the 
enemy was, but while this was in 
progress, the Taliban continued to 
move south. At this point, they could 
not be engaged from the air because 
of an ROE (rules of engagement) 
issue, so the pursuit continued. 
 The Taliban force, numbering 
some 17 personnel, crossed the river. 
7 Platoon engaged with 7.62 mm 
machine gun fire when the Taliban 
silhouetted themselves on the skyline 
and then the enemy split up. One 
group of six struck southwest into the 
desert, while the remainder dodged 
9 Platoon and swung north, trying to 
cross the river and flank them. At this 
point, they were engaged by a B-1B 
using three GBU-38 500-lb bombs. 
The strike, conducted around 0810 
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hours, was estimated to have killed 
four and wounded three Taliban. 
The survivors turned east, heading 
towards Zharey. 7 Platoon moved 
east, south of the river, and 9 Platoon 
moved east, while the Fire Support 
group manoeuvred into several 
blocking positions to the north. In 
time the pursuit turned up nothing 
as the enemy hid their weapons 
and melted away in the compound 
complexes near BATH. 
 The effects of the dance between 
“C” Company and the Taliban in 
Objectives NEWCASTLE and BATH 
was immediate. ISTAR resources 
reported that there was an enemy 
leadership target in the area. The 
combination of the Predator and 
the B-1B were kept on station as 
long as possible in case more enemy 
presented themselves. 
 Meanwhile, “A” Company’s 
searches continued in CHELSEA. The 
NDS team working with the company 
discovered suspect materials of what 
might be IED production materials of 
a new type, but it turned out not to 
be the case. Of more interest was the 
discovery of a modified white Toyota 
Corolla, a type commonly associated 
with SVBIED’s (suicide vehicle-borne 
improvised explosive device) in RC 
(South). Numerous papers, ID cards, 
and notebooks were uncovered and 
sent off for translation. Then ISTAR 
resources reported that another 
enemy medium value target was 
right – Close air support was used during 
Op SOHIL LARAM II including a successful 
strike by a US Air Force B-1B on a Taliban 
group attempting to exfiltrate the 
engagement area.
centre right – The Viking oversnow vehicle 
was adapted for use in Afghanistan. 
Crewed by Royal Marines, this Viking troop 
acted as a mobile screen during cordon 
and search operations around Band-e 
Timor.
bottom right – Moving along Highway 1 from 
the DERBY box to Hutel, the battalion tac 
Vector vehicles halt so the Gurkhas can 
conduct a defile drill to deter IED attack.
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located in a compound complex 
adjacent to CHELSEA. That made 
two significant enemy leaders present 
in Band-e Timor. “A” Company then 
detained an individual who was part 
of the Taliban early warning network. 
It was 0845 hours on the first day.
Execution: Influence 
Operations
An important aspect of operations like SOHIL LARAM II is how 
the manoeuvre force relates to the 
population. The intended effects 
of this relationship were built into 
the plan. Indeed, the deployment 
of the battalion CO and his tactical 
headquarters early in the operation in 
part related to influence operations. 
These  opera t ions  essent ia l ly 
combined information operations and 
CIMIC assessments with on-the-spot 
assessments of the religious/political, 
tribal and community dynamics 
while the operation was in progress 
with the aim of positively influencing 
the population. Fundamentally, there 
are local dynamics that cannot be 
captured by the broader examination 
of tribal dynamics or provincial 
political processes in southern 
Afghanistan. The only way to do so 
is through immediate close contact 
with the population. 
 The primary tool in the case 
of SOHIL LARAM II was the Key 
Leader Engagement (KLE) where 1 
RGR sought out local leaders and 
met with them in shuras with other 
local elders and power brokers. Using 
interpreters and the accompanying 
NDS personnel ,  the meetings 
yielded valuable information on the 
attitudes of the community as well 
as their needs, in addition to tactical 
information on enemy activities. The 
meetings also permitted PSYOPS to 
disseminate their messages in subtle 
ways and explain to the local leaders 
and people what the coalition forces 
were doing in the area and why. In 
theory, follow-on CIMIC activities 
and then development assistance 
from the Provincial Reconstruction 
Team would follow but in the case of 
a foray like SOHIL LARAM II, only 
assessments within the constraints of 
the tactical situation could be made. 
Development could only take place 
with the long term domination of 
the area by Afghan national security 
forces 
 1 RGR conducted numerous 
KLEs and shuras in the Band-e 
Timor communities during the 
course of SOHIL LARAM II. The 
presence of the 1 RGR CO and his 
tactical headquarters on the ground 
with “A” Company was useful. 
Having an older head man from the 
coalition meeting with the local elders 
facilitated dialogue in ways that were 
not as effective with younger men 
meeting with older men in certain 
A pair of M-777 155 mm guns from “B” 
Battery, 2 Royal Canadian Horse artillery 
firing from the DERBY box in support of 
“A” Company, 1st Battalion, The Royal 
Gurkha Rifles.
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circumstances. Respect goes a long 
way and it is generation-based in the 
Pashtun culture. 
 The picture that emerged after 
several KLEs, though generalized, 
was at odds with the perception 
that the communities were pro-
Taliban and had been for several 
years. The message transmitted to 
the coalition forces was that the 
bulk of the population would in fact 
welcome an Afghan National Army 
presence, even ANA strong points. 
They were generally not supportive 
of the Taliban, but they had no 
choice because there was little or no 
government presence. They did not, 
however, want an Afghan National 
Police presence. The population had 
extremely poor relations with the 
ANP in Hutel, and even referred to 
them as “bastards.” They informed 
coalition personnel that they had 
problems getting produce to the 
markets in Hutel. Whether this 
was the result of actions by corrupt 
police, insurgents dressed as police, 
or a combination was difficult to 
determine, but practically all elders 
called for the removal of the current 
district leader. The people were 
interested in improved health care 
and an education system, but the 
attitude of “we’ll believe it when we 
see it” prevailed. Indeed, the CIMIC 
teams learned that, surprisingly, 
many landowners lived in Kabul and 
rarely visited Band-e Timor. 
 Note that KLE’s were not always 
a matter of just sitting down and 
drinking tea. On one occasion 
personnel accompanying the CO 
were menaced by a disheveled, 
crazed young man wielding a pick. 
He was tied to a tree by two elders 
to prevent him from interfering with 
the shura. 
 The insertion and manoeuvre of 
the 1 RGR battlegroup had a number 
of other effects on the enemy forces 
throughout Band-e Timor-Hutel 
triangle. ISTAR resources detected 
enemy activity consistent with a plan 
to screen the escape of leaders, some 
of whom appeared to be in Objective 
YORK. One enemy group or observer 
had “eyes on” the Canadian 155 mm 
gun position and Gurkha echelon 
located at DERBY. The CO was 
concerned that the enemy, though 
psychologically off balance, would 
stay put and wait out the operation, so 
he pressed for more manoeuvre with 
the intent to get the enemy moving, 
get him to make mistakes and make 
him vulnerable to strikes or capture. 
The low level of civilian pattern of 
life was surprising and was a possible 
indicator that the population was 
not interested in providing cover for 
enemy movement out of fear of being 
targeted by coalition forces. 
 A s  t h e  d a y  p r o g r e s s e d , 
more attention was paid to the 
compounds in Objective YORK by 
ISTAR resources. It was increasingly 
apparent that one or more enemy 
leaders were located somewhere in 
there. At least one was ordered by 
his high command in Pakistan to 
leave and avoid being captured at 
all costs. Other enemy groups in Op 
Boxes BURMA and MALAYA were 
ordered by their higher headquarters 
to escape while they could. “A” 
Company was ordered to prepare 
for a future tasking in that area. As 
ISTAR assets scoured the district, the 
155 mm guns were readied and more 
air power was requested, just in case 
anything moved. The ISTAR priority 
remained Objective YORK. 
 The enemy knew there were 
coalition forces in CHELSEA and 
he could see that the cordon and 
searches had been extended from the 
compounds in CHELSEA to those in 
LEICESTERSHIRE. To the enemy, 
it looked like “A” Company was 
plodding its way east through the 
various complexes. The 1 RGR plan 
was to finish with LEICESTERSHIRE 
and then “tab” (route march) to 
DONCASTER, make it look like the 
force was bedding down to deceive 
observers, and then conduct a rapid 
night approach march along the 
Arghandab river and arrive at YORK 
at first light to search the compounds. 
A joint Afghan National Army-Maywand 
District police patrol prepares to deploy 
into Hutel from the district centre. 
These patrols are crucial in establishing 
government presence in this volatile 
district.
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The Viking squadron would depart 
DORCHESTER just before first light 
to establish a screen north of YORK 
to catch any “leakers.”
 Meanwhile, the Fire Support 
Group snipers screening to the north 
of “C” Company were observing 
people moving about Objective 
DOVER but were unable to determine 
whether they were enemy forces. 
When “C” Company got into the 
compounds, they determined that 
the leadership target that had been 
there had slipped away, possibly 
headed north to Hutel. The presence 
of two Harrier GR-7 close support 
aircraft flying up and down the river 
appeared to have deterred any enemy 
movement south.
 While “A” Company was laying 
up in DONCASTER and preparing 
for the night tab, ISTAR resources 
identified one of the leadership 
targets as a logistics facilitator but he 
was located west of DONCASTER, 
about a kilometer away. This target 
appeared to be different from the 
one(s) in YORK. Should the plan be 
altered to take him out or not? The 
decision was made to search for him 
but to carry on with YORK. Attempts 
were made to get an American 
Pathfinder Platoon from TF EAGLE 
ASSAULT and insert them to get him, 
or if that were not possible, bring 
in a section of US Army OH-58D 
Warrior recce helicopters, but the 
forces were not available. To the east, 
“C” Company reported the seizure of 
a small number of weapons in their 
areas. The locals claimed the Taliban 
“left yesterday.” This was most likely 
the group engaged by the B-1B. More 
importantly, “C” Company reported 
that the locals were hostile to coalition 
forces the closer they were to Zharey 
district. Thus far, it looked like there 
were at least three leadership targets 
on the loose south of Hutel.
 “A” Company’s night tab and 
early morning entry in YORK was 
anti-climactic. A major KLE was 
held, however, late in the morning 
at YORK. The elders here told the 
coalition forces they welcomed a 
ANA but not an ANP presence, that 
the enemy moved through the area 
but the locals would not let them 
stay in the area out of fear of coalition 
air strikes. It appeared as though 
the Taliban acquiesced to the locals 
without a lot of intimidation because 
this was the only route to resupply its 
forces in Zharey district and they did 
not want a hostile population on such 
vital ground. Interestingly, the local 
leaders explained that Taliban forces 
moving through their complexes 
spoke Punjabi, not Pashtun, and that 
this was a common occurrence. 
 There were no contacts and 
ISTAR resources  detected no 
leadership target movement in that 
objective area, though it looked like 
the DONCASTER contact wanted to 
make his way to Helmand province 
to the west. “A” Company was 
ordered back to LEICESTERSHIRE 
with the Viking screen to try and hunt 
the DONCASTER contact.
 ISTAR then reported that another 
leadership target that had been in 
YORK was on the move and was 
no longer in YORK. How he got 
out was a mystery, but clumps of 
newly-shaven hair were discovered 
near a compound he may have 
been hiding in, so he may have 
altered his appearance and departed. 
ISTAR resources reported yet another 
medium-value leader who evacuated 
Op Box BURMA as the Gurkhas 
moved towards it. Unfortunately, 
the resources needed to identify and 
engage him were not available. 
Execution: Consolidation
Concurrent activity in Hutel and the surrounding area on the 
second day of the operation produced 
immediate results. The Gurkha 
platoon and Canadian CIMIC and 
PSYOPS initiated a series of joint 
patrols with the newly-arrived ANP 
and awaited engineering resources 
to start the reconstruction of the 
ANP checkpoints on Highway 4. 
The joint patrols discovered that 
there were hard feelings towards 
coalition forces dating back to at least 
2002 when the poppy eradication 
programme was initiated by the 
Afghan Interim Administration. 
At some point around 20 farmers 
were killed during demonstrations. 
The patrols immediately explained 
that the coalition and the Afghan 
security forces were not in Maywand 
to eradicate poppy, that they were 
there to improve security and hunt 
Taliban. This impromptu information 
operation countered the prevailing 
Taliban information ops message 
that the coalition presence would dis-
enfranchise and starve the farmers 
and their families. 
 Hutel bazaar was a thriving 
collection of establishments, despite 
Taliban attempts to intimidate the 
populace. The latest attempt was 
six weeks prior when 16 policemen 
were executed after their checkpoint 
was seized west of the town. ISTAR 
resources discovered that there were 
in fact enemy present in the western 
part of Hutel and they had 1 RGR 
under observation. An enemy cell 
planned to place an IED on Highway 
1 but the plan was thwarted by the 
presence of the joint patrols. 
 The joint patrols also turned up 
some significant finds on day three. 
Two white Toyota Corollas were 
discovered in a wadi concealed with 
a tarp. They were full of fuel and in 
good running order. There were no 
weapons found, but it was likely that 
these vehicles were pre-positioned so 
they could be quickly modified for 
SVBIED use or as getaway cars for 
enemy leadership. Indeed, ISTAR 
reported that there were enemy 
nearby but details remained vague. 
The vehicles were confiscated and 
none of the locals complained. 
 “C” Company continued with its 
operations to the south east. A sniper 
lay back observation post spotted two 
pick up trucks behaving suspiciously 
in the evening near the locations of 
the B-1B strikes. They appeared to be 
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cleaning up the remains of the strike 
or looking for wounded, The vehicles 
disappeared into the desert before 
they could be engaged by a pair of 
F-16’s that were on station. 
 “ C ”  C o m p a n y  r e m a i n e d 
interested in the area, as there were 
indications from KLE’s that the 
locals were annoyed with coalition 
opera t ions ,  probably  spec ia l 
operations forces operations, that 
bothered them at night. The NDS 
detachment confirmed from the 
locals that leadership targets had 
been moving through the area, that 
it was a waypoint for personnel, 
not weapons storage. They also 
developed a theory that the Taliban 
groups that took off during the first 
night were a protection party for a 
significant Taliban leader and their 
starburst actions were designed to 
distract the coalition forces from 
locating and engaging the enemy 
leader. 
 Other information developed by 
the NDS and various ISTAR resources 
confirmed that there were still 
leadership targets in the area between 
the river and Hutel and learned that 
there was a safe house that catered 
to Taliban commanders somewhere 
near Objectives SINGAPORE and 
CANTERBURY. As there was a lack 
of “fidelity” on the target, 1 RGR 
battlegroup remained focused on 
securing the district centre in Hutel 
and working on the checkpoints 
before expanding the joint patrols 
outwards prematurely. 
 Then the enemy detonated 
an IED amidst an ANP convoy, 
wounding four. Incredibly, the ANP 
apprehended two insurgents who 
had other devices or components 
on them. They were brought to the 
district centre for interrogation by 
the ANP. Not to be outdone, “A” 
Company searches to the southwest 
uncovered IED components in a 
village west of DERBY. Two more 
prisoners were taken, both were 
in possession of cell phones and 
coughed up useful information on 
enemy movements in the district 
and the types of vehicles they were 
employing. 
 At  this  point ,  the shift  of 
emphasis was confirmed by the CO. 
“C” Company would focus solely 
on influence operations with the 
ANP in and around Hutel awaiting 
the arrival of the ANA, while 
“A” Company would search and 
exploit any information it collected 
along BURMA, MALAYA and 
SINGAPORE.
 The plan for SOHIL LARAM 
II took into account the possibility 
that Afghan National Army forces 
might participate but the 2nd ANA 
Kandak in Zharey district was itself 
preparing to rotate out and it was not 
clear what forces would be available 
or for how long. Lieutenant-Colonel 
Shareen Shah, the CO of 2nd Kandak, 
determined that two companies 
would deploy from Howz-e Madad 
in Zharey to Hutel for two days. The 
idea was to conduct as many joint 
ANA-ANP patrols as possible in the 
area to demonstrate to the population 
that the ANA and new Maywand 
ANP were going to cooperate 
effectively from now on, cement 
the linkages procedurally between 
the two forces and get them used to 
working together.
 On day four,  around 0830 
hours, a seeming endless stream of 
ANA vehicles started to arrive in 
Hutel – Ford Ranger pick up trucks, 
International 2.5-ton trucks, and even 
several mottled Hummers equipped 
with 12.7 mm machine guns. At the 
end of the column, several Canadian 
RG-31 vehicles discreetly entered the 
district headquarters compound. This 
Two of the ubiquitous white Toyota Corollas were seized by one of the joint patrols
before they could be converted for use as suicide improvised explosive devices.
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was the 12-man Operational Mentor 
and Liaison Team (OMLT) led by 
Major Corey Frederickson from 3rd 
Battalion Princess Patricia’s Canadian 
Light Infantry, who mentored 
elements of 2nd Kandak. The stream 
of vehicles continued for some time 
and the entire population turned out 
to watch. These ANA soldiers, unlike 
their predecessors from two years 
ago, wore helmets, body armour, 
chest rigs and carried themselves 
with some professionalism. The 
ANP were visibly envious. The 
PSYOPS team working the crowds 
detected a feeling that approximated 
to “the cavalry has arrived.” It was 
evident from conversations with the 
left – Gurkha medics, under the direction 
of Dr. D.F. Reid, and members of the 
Canadian Operational Mentor and Liaison 
Team work to save the lives of wounded 
Afghan soldiers.
Above – A US Army UH-60 prepares to lift 
off with some of the Afghan National Army 
casulaties.
people that they were surprised and 
even proud that the ANA was in 
Hutel. This psychological effect was 
identified and exploited as soon as 
possible. Lieutenant-Colonel Shah 
immediately linked up with the Hutel 
ANP and launched a series of foot 
and vehicle patrols throughout the 
area with the police and with “C” 
Company. 
 While the Afghan national security 
force (ANSF) saturation of Hutel 
and environs was underway, “A” 
Company continued its movements 
to the south west near DERBY and 
around LEICESTERSHIRE and 
CHELSEA. Using the Viking squadron 
as a screen, “A” Company collected 
significant low-level intelligence 
related to Taliban activities in the 
area. Then the Royal Marines bagged 
a “leaker” from one of the searches, 
who was identified as Taliban. This 
individual gave up a relative and 
the NDS identified both as local 
Taliban leaders. They were passed 
on to Hutel for exploitation with 
the hope they would give up more 
elements of the facilitation network. 
The NDS exploited several document 
and laptop finds and found lists 
of enemy personnel, and a list of 
judges that had been paid off by 
the Taliban to release captured 
insurgents. Other documentation 
detailed links to support areas in 
Pakistan. There was so much material 
it had to be transported elsewhere for 
exploitation. The hunt continued. 
 Canadian CIMIC and PSYOPS 
teams accompanied the joint Gurkha-
ANSF patrols throughout Hutel. The 
picture they developed, confirmed by 
ISTAR, was at odds with previous 
assessments. Only the northwest 
quadrant of Hutel was seriously 
pro-Taliban. For the most part, 75 
percent or more of the population 
was supportive of the government. 
As before, they were intimidated by 
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the previous Maywand police forces 
and tended to sit on the fence. Indeed, 
the local clinic sold medical supplies 
to the Taliban to keep them away.
 7 Platoon deployed west along 
Highway 1 with engineers and 
ANP and continued to refurbish the 
checkpoint system. The Gurkhas 
conducted a series of clearance patrols 
and vehicle checkpoints to clear each 
site to facilitate construction. ISTAR 
reportage also identified possible 
enemy leaders in a compound 
complex south of the district centre, 
so Lieutenant-Colonel Shah deployed 
two of his platoons, accompanied by 
Gurkhas and Canadians, to conduct 
searches. 
 ISTAR reportage continued 
throughout the evening. First there 
was a threat warning of possible IED 
placement west of the district centre 
on the highway. This IED attack was 
to be accompanied by an ambush. 
ANSF foot patrols flooded into the 
areas and successfully deterred this 
attack. The device was found and 
blown up, which really annoyed 
the local Taliban cell leader. Further 
reportage indicated that an enemy 
medium value leadership target was 
present somewhere in the compounds 
east of the district centre. 
 While night was falling “C” 
Company developed an outline 
plan to go after him. The problem 
was the complexity of this particular 
built-up area, which amounted to a 
rabbit warren of compounds, alleys, 
walled cultivated areas and streams. 
It would be difficult to seal off the 
area, this would require the whole 
battalion, but the close proximity to 
the district centre weighed in favour 
of an audacious move. A platoon 
from “C” Company went in trying to 
get as close as possible to the enemy 
leader. A chase ensued, doors were 
kicked in, and some rounds fired. 
Unfortunately, the target escaped. 
 The next morning, a Gurkha 
patrol with Canadian CIMIC and 
PSYOPS personnel went back into 
this community to conduct effects 
mitigation. The patrol offered 
compensation to house owners 
who had property damaged during 
the pursuit. Interestingly, nearly 
every citizen had doors kicked in 
and all demanded compensation. 
Despite some hard feelings, the patrol 
assessed that this community was 
still pro-government and were not 
knowingly hiding the enemy leader. 
It appeared that a non-governmental 
organization that had an office in 
this community was assisting this 
individual move around and hide.
 The day 2nd Kandak was 
scheduled to re-deploy back to Zharey 
was wrought with tragedy. An ANA 
soldier had a negligent discharge 
with an RPG launcher inside a 
concrete room which essentially 
shredded the lower extremities of 
eight Afghan soldiers. Gurkha medics 
led by Dr. D.F Reid rushed to the site 
while the Canadian OMLT soldiers 
worked to stabilize the wounded. A 
US Army UH-60 and a USAF HH-60 
flew in to evacuate the wounded. 
Unfortunately, seven of the eight 
stricken Afghans eventually died 
of their wounds. ISTAR determined 
that the enemy had “eyes on” the 
whole process and steps were taken 
to deter their planned actions against 
the MEDEVAC helicopters. 
 T h e  T a l i b a n  i m m e d i a t e l y 
exploited this event for information 
operations purposes and spread the 
word throughout Hutel that they 
had attacked the ANA and caused 
the casualties. The situation was 
complicated by the fact that 2nd 
Kandak was leaving. This could 
become an information ops victory for 
the Taliban if they could portray the 
scheduled withdrawal as a response 
to the casualties they suppposedly 
inflicted and thus reduce the positive 
effects generated by the joint ANSF 
patrolling. The Canadian PSYOPS 
and CIMIC operators deployed with 
Gurkha and ANP patrols to counter 
the enemy message during the course 
of the next day. Surprisingly, the 
teams learned that local people, 
some of them four kilometres from 
Hutel, already knew that the blast 
was an accident and was not Taliban 
action. 
During a night raid in Hutel, private 
property was damaged. A Canadian 
PSYOPS/CIMIC team accompanied by a 
Gurkha patrol conducts compensation 
activities with the local population.
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 One of the other enemy medium 
value leadership targets was moving 
between NEWCASTLE and a position 
south of the district centre. There was 
some concern that he might collect 
fighters and, emboldened by the 
RPG tragedy, mount a night attack 
against the district centre to profit 
from the situation and enhance 
the Taliban’s stature with both the 
Taliban-supportive population and 
to intimidate the pro-government 
population. The attack failed to 
materialize for unknown reasons. 
Other cells to the west of the district 
centre, thwarted in their activities 
and frustrated, were trying to bring 
RPGs and another IED into the area to 
ambush coalition vehicles traveling 
down Highway 1. Foot patrols sent 
into the area coupled with the low 
level pass of a pair of Mirage 2000 
fighters deterred this activity. 
 ISTAR reportage indicated that 
one of the enemy leaders had made 
his way to Helmand province, while 
another was trying to get out of the 
area south east of the district centre. 
Op SOHIL LARAM II was winding 
down and the resources to conduct 
a detailed search for this individual 
were not available, but it was clear 
that the raid to the east of the district 
centre looking for the third leader 
unsettled the enemy that remained 
in the Hutel area. In effect, they 
ordered their people to go to ground, 
stop communicating, and cease 
operations. 
Resolution
After seven days of operations in Maywand district, Task Force 
TIGER re-deployed to Kandahar 
Air Field and made its preparations 
to depart Afghanistan and return 
to its home station in Brunei. The 
Canadian CIMIC and PSYOPS teams 
were sent back to Maywand almost 
immediatley once RC (South) and 
TF Kandahar assessed the situation 
and realized that an opportunity 
presented itself. Sufficient forces 
were not available for a complete 
occupation of the district, but creative 
ways to maintain the momentum 
generated by Op SOHIL LARAM II 
were explored and implemented in 
March 2008. 
 As  with  any operat ion in 
Afghanistan, determining specific 
long or short term effects is no easy 
task. One of the most important was 
the relative lack of enemy action 
directed at the relief in place of the 
Canadian battlegroup in Zharey 
and Panjwayi districts, short of 
some IED activity. When the enemy 
did attempt to engage Canadian 
forces in western Zharey/Panjwayi 
he lacked the ammunition to do 
so effecively and even complained 
about that fact. Similarly, there was 
almost no ambush or IED activity 
directed against forces travelling 
along Highway 1 between Helmand 
and Kandahar for some weeks. Again 
determining exactly why this was the 
case is open to some interpretation, 
but a tentative conclusion can be 
made with some confidence. 
 Substantial information on the 
Taliban’s structure in Maywand 
district was collected during the 
course of the operation. There was also 
increased confidence demonstrated 
by the Afghan police and army 
outwards towards the population 
and internally between the two 
organizations. Taken together, this 
provided any follow on force or 
security measures a solid base for 
future action. Demonstrating to 
the enemy that Maywand was no 
longer a safe haven or a seam though 
ambiguous on the surface, has the 
potential to contribute positively 
towards a pro-government orientation 
later on as well. 
 Finally Operation SOHIL LARAM 
II forced several enemy commanders 
to scatter from what they viewed as 
a comfortable no-go zone. This in 
turn made them vulnerable to other 
coalition action and at the same time 
disrupted whatever plans they were 
working on at the time. 
 Operation SOHIL LARAM II 
confirmed that the posession of an 
operational manoeuvre capacity by 
Regional Command (South), when 
wielded properly, could generate 
positive operational as well as tactical 
effects in the complex environment of 
southern Afghanistan in the face of an 
insurgent enemy. To commemorate 
the new link forged between the 
Canadian army and the Gurkhas, 
1 RGR was awarded the Canadian 
Forces Unit Commendation in May 
2008:
For outstandign elan and exemplary 
combat skills that directly contributed 
to the overall success of Task 
Force Kandahar during Operation 
ATHENA, Afghanistan, Sep 07 to 
Mar 08.
Notes
A Note on Sources – The author observed 
the operational planning process for SOHIL 
LARAM II at Regional Command (South), 
Task Force Kandahar, and 1 RGR battlegroup 
and then accompanied the Gurkha battalion 
into the field for the duration of the operation. 
Certain control measures have been altered 
and intelligence sources blurred for operational 
security considerations. 
1. The Helmand-deployed 1 RGR company 
occupied a forward operating base near 
Garmsir. Not coincidentally, the Joint 
Terminal Air Controller assigned to that 
company was a certain “Captain Harry 
Wales,” better known as Prince Harry. 
2. The TLAV is a dramatically re-engineered 
M-113A3 APC.
3. This was the failed US operation to rescue 
the American hostages held in Iran in 
April 1980. The mission was aborted with 
the loss of eight US lives, seven RH-53D 
helicopters and a C-130 transport aircraft. 
One of the main contributing factors 
to the disaster was an unexpected dust 
storm in the Iranian desert.
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